Naval Training Ties Keep India–Bangladesh Engagement Afloat

Even as diplomatic engagement between India and Bangladesh slowed over the past 18 months, cooperation between their navies has continued with little disruption. A key reason has been the Indian Navy’s long-running training engagement under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, which has helped keep maritime ties functional despite political uncertainty in Dhaka.

During 2025, the two navies conducted Exercise Bongosagar and an India–Bangladesh Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) in the Bay of Bengal. This took place at a time when official visits were limited and public debate in Bangladesh often carried a sceptical tone. Even so, maritime drills went ahead. Patrol sectors were coordinated. Communication procedures were followed. There was little drama—and that, in itself, was telling.

For years, India has trained Bangladeshi naval officers under ITEC. These courses cover practical areas such as navigation, engineering, hydrography and maritime policing—skills officers use at sea. Figures tell the story. A total of 39 training slots were given to Bangladesh in 2023–24, with 37 utilised and the number rose to 42 in 2024–25, with 34 officers attending courses in India. From 2016–17 to 2024–25, a total of 491 Bangladeshi personnel received training in India under the ITEC program, marking nearly a decade of steady maritime cooperation.

Even during the most uncertain phase in 2024–25, Bangladeshi officers continued to attend courses in Indian naval institutions.

Elsewhere, defence cooperation proved more fragile. The army exercise SAMPRITI has remained suspended since 2023. In 2025, Bangladesh cancelled a defence contract with an Indian shipbuilder, reflecting how sensitive hardware deals can become when politics intrudes. Naval engagement, by contrast, required no renegotiation.

Those differences were visible at sea.

During the 2025 exercises, Indian and Bangladeshi ships conducted boarding drills, manoeuvres and communication exercises with little friction. Officers involved repeatedly pointed to the same factor: shared training. Not trust built overnight, but routines developed over years.

This pattern is not unique to Bangladesh. Across the Indian Ocean, from Sri Lanka to Mauritius, India’s naval relationships are shaped less by platforms and more by people. Training builds professional networks that survive election cycles and diplomatic pauses.

That approach fits within India’s broader SAGAR framework (Security and Growth for All in the Region). Rather than binding partners into rigid security arrangements, the emphasis is on capacity, familiarity and steady cooperation. It is slower. It is quieter. But it endures.

Bangladesh illustrates the result. Even when the political relationship cooled, maritime cooperation continued predictably and professionally.

In a region where strategic competition is intensifying and miscalculation at sea carries real risks, continuity matters. The 2025 naval engagements were not symbolic gestures. They demonstrated that some relationships, once built deeply enough, continue to function—even when the surface appears unsettled.