Anchored to Beijing: Disaster awaiting as Pakistan’s navy puts all eggs in the China basket?

When the Pakistan Navy’s newest frigates, the Type-054A/P Tughril-class, steamed into Karachi in 2022 and 2023, the grey hulls drew applause and fly-pasts. Four identical warships, armed to the teeth and fresh from Chinese shipyards, were presented as proof of Pakistan being able to keep pace in the northern Arabian Sea.
Alas, behind the pageantry, the reality is rather awkward. Much of Pakistan’s modern fleet is conceived, built, armed and sustained by one country: China. And that is a cause of concern.

Over the past ten odd years or so, Islamabad has turned almost exclusively to Beijing for its big-ticket naval acquisitions. The four Tughril-class frigates, eight Hangor-class submarines now under construction, and a steady flow of smaller ships, weapons and sensors have all come from Chinese contracts. 

Pakistan has chosen to put all its eggs in the same basket. That's a bad call, but Islamabad has little room to manoeuvre.

The reasons are not mysterious. Western export restrictions have choked other supply lines. China offers financing that eases the up-front sting. And Beijing is willing to deliver a full combat package— hull, weapons, electronics and support— in one deal. The downside is less visible but just as real: dependence on a single vendor’s shipyards, spare parts, and political goodwill.

Support on the clock

Turnkey acquisitions look neat on delivery day. Standardised systems make crew training simpler and logistics more predictable. But over the years, cracks can show. Chinese after-sales support has a patchy record. 
In Bangladesh, two Chinese Ming-class submarines have spent long periods ashore for maintenance; in Myanmar, a similar boat is used mostly for training. Delays in spare part shipments and limited local repair capacity have kept availability low.

For Pakistan, that kind of lag can be costly. A missing component or an offline combat system, even for a few days or weeks, risks sidelining a ship in the middle of a crisis.

Engines tell their own story

The Hangor-class submarines have already offered a cautionary tale. They were meant to use German MTU diesel engines, but Berlin had blocked the export. 

The boats will now be fitted with China’s CHD-620 engines. This is the same substitution that forced a three-year delay in Thailand’s S26T project. The Chinese powerplant has yet to prove itself in export service.
The technical-sounding term, “propulsion” is much more than the name lets on. It shapes range, speed, and how quietly a submarine can move. If the Hangors are noisier or less efficient than advertised, the Indian Navy’s expanding anti-submarine network will find them easier to track.

Politics in the mix

In any confrontation at sea, Pakistan’s navy must weigh not only its own readiness but also how far China is prepared to backstop its platforms. A drawn-out clash that risks damaging Chinese-built ships could trigger Beijing’s behind-the-scenes influence — spares slowed, technical support delayed, quiet pressure to step back.

A different path across the water

India’s navy has spread its bets. Domestic shipbuilding programmes — from the INS Vikrant aircraft carrier to the Kamorta-class corvettes — mix Indian and foreign systems. That diversity allows upgrades and deployments without relying on a single country’s supply chain or political mood.

For now, Pakistan shows no sign of changing course. The Hangors are in production, the Tughrils are sailing, and more Chinese projects are on the table. Each delivery tightens the same tie. In peacetime, the trade-off feels manageable. In wartime, it could leave Pakistan’s fleet waiting for decisions made far from Karachi…in Beijing.