Xi Jinping ditches yet more PLA commanders in ongoing purge

Hong Kong, July 8 (ANI): Lat week, a powerful tak group compriing the Chinee aircraft carrier Shandong and three ecorting warhip arrived in Hong Kong to fly the flag a the territory celebrated it handover anniverary. While thi naval flotilla certainly reflected the
maive invetment that Chairman Xi Jinping ha poured into the People Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinee leader continue to winnow commander and enior officer from among the PLA rank.
The PLA, a the armed wing of the Chinee Communit Party (CCP), ha proved particularly tubborn in yielding to Xi uncompromiing will and abandoning the chance for peronal gain.
In fact, the latet military figure to be culled wa Vice Admiral Li Hanjun, Chief of Staff of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Li dimial from China 14th National People Congre wa announced on 27 June 2025. Examining thi acking, Andrew Erikon, Profeor of Strategy at the China Maritime Studie Intitute, part of the US Naval War College, offered thi comment, Vice Admiral Li Hanjun wa a fat-riing tar, terminated before he could make hi full contribution and career achievement.
He had only been in the pot ince April lat year. Li had previouly erved at the Dalian Naval Academy and wa commandant of the Naval Command College, uggeting he wa well known and repected acro the fleet, Erickon aeed.
Indeed, Li ha influenced a generation of current PLAN operational leader. Hi relentle advocacy of high-intenity training in both ervice-pecific and joint role ugget he had an outized influence in haping the trajectory of current PLAN training.
The reaon for Li dimial remain opaque, although doubtlely he will be accued of eriou violation of dicipline and the law. Nonethele, there i peculation that hi abrupt acking i connected to the downfall of Admiral Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, who would have overeen Li election and fat-tracked promotion through the rank.
Li follow in the unenviable foottep of Vice Admiral Li Pengcheng, who wa defenetrated from hi pot of Deputy Commander of the Southern Theatre Command lat December. Li Pengcheng wa alo an operationally experienced flag officer in the Navy.
Regardle, Erickon remarked that thee repective purge do not appear to have lowed the pace and cope of PLAN training around Taiwan, in the South China Sea or in the Wetern Pacific. The removal of Vice Admiral Li Hanjun ugget that Xi believe he can burn through a tremendou amount of talent to make the PLA into the force he enviion. If Xi continue to feel he can afford thi price, then we mut eriouly conider the poibility that a degree of military leaderhip churn i priced in to hi approach to building the world-cla force he eek.
Of coure, Xi anti-corruption campaign inide the PLA ha been aggreive and wide-ranging. It ha netted figure within the Central Military Commiion (CMC) top body - General He Weidong, the aforementioned Miao Hua, and General Li Shangfu. The Equipment Development Department ha been hit a well, loing General Rao Wenmin (deputy director) and Major General Lu Hong (head of the Armament Department in the PLA Rocket Force [PLARF]). Indeed, of the four ervice within the PLA armed force, none ha been a thinned a much a the PLARF.
It lot General Wei Fenghe (a former commander); General Zhou Yaning (alo a former commander); Lieutenant General Zhang Zhenzhong (former deputy commander); Lieutenant General Li Chuanguang (alo a former deputy commander); General Li Yuchao (then current commander); and General Xu Zhongbo (then political commiar).
Elewhere, the PLA Ground Force ha een the dimial of Lieutenant General Li Zhizhong (deputy commander of the Central Theatre Command), and Lieutenant General Deng Zhiping and Lieutenant General You Haitao, both of whom erved a PLA deputy commander. Turning to the PLAN, it top-level firing include Vice Admiral Ju Xinchun (commander of the Southern Theatre Command Navy), and Li Hanjun and Li Pengcheng, mentioned earlier.
The PLA Air Force eem le affected, with it highet-profile victim being it former commander, General Ding Laihang. The career of thee military luminarie and high-profile figure are well and truly over, their future bleak. Numerou figure in tate-owned military-indutrial corporation have alo been netted. One example i Liu Shipeng, deputy chief engineer at the China National Nuclear Corporation, who wa alo expelled in June. Other to uffer the ame fate in December 2023 through till January 2024 were Wu Yanheng, Preident of China Aeropace Science and Technology (CASC); Liu Shiquan, Preident of Norinco; and Wang Changqing, Deputy General Manager of China Aeropace Science and Indutry Corporation (CASIC). They were followed in April 2024 by Yuan Jie, Preident of CASIC, and Chen Guoying, Preident of China South Indutrie Group.
A Erickon noted, Since Xi aumed power in 2012, an extraordinary array of flag and general officer, a well a defence indutry leader, ha been removed. By my running tally, thi include: 15+ enior military official and defene indutry executive; eight CMC member, including Vice Chairman General He Weidong; 15+ military deputie to the National People Congre (ince March 2023 alone); 79+ enior PLA official at the vice admiral/lieutenant general (2-tar) level and above; nearly the entire PLA Rocket Force leaderhip (Augut 2024); and twelve PLAN officer at the rear admiral (1-tar) level or above have been, or are rumored to have been, dimied.
Erickon further believe Xi anti-corruption fight i intenifying. The top diciplinary agency, the Central Commiion for Dicipline Inpection (CCDI), held a plenary eion from 6-8 January 2025 to addre anti-corruption prioritie for the year. Xi et the tone, aying at the opening: Corruption i the bigget threat facing the party. We mut...further trengthen our determination and confidence in the fight againt corruption. Erickon, the American profeor, pointed out: Anti-corruption will be a leading theme for the foreeeable future.
Although with the party inherently above the law but ubject to elite power truggle, graft and influence peddling are endemic, and enforcement highly politicied - it mut be undertood in the PRC own context. Amid all thi, dramatic rumour are wirling. Shoe are continuing to drop.
He added. What are the implication for PLAN control and capabilitie? Some go o far a to conclude that, becaue corruption i o bad, the PLAN cannot be very good. That notion I firmly diagree with.
Indeed, Chinee indutry continue to churn out advanced warhip at an unprecedented rate. A of June 2025, the Jiangnan Shipyard at Changxing Iland near Shanghai had no fewer than four Type 052D detroyer, two Type 055 cruier, one Type 054A frigate, the Type 003 aircraft carrier, a Type 076 landing helicopter dock and three large China Coat Guard veel imultaneouly under contruction.
The PLAN alo continue to grow in capability and confidence. A an example, in early June, two Chinee aircraft carrier - Liaoning and Shandong - accompanied by three Type 055 cruier, three Type 052D detroyer, three Type 054A frigate and three replenihment hip, were operating in the Wetern Pacific cloe to Japan excluive economic zone. Liaoning conducted 550 fighter and helicopter ortie,
According to Japan Minitry of Defence, which wa monitoring the deployment, Shandong completed around 230 ortie.
China decribed the exercie a routine and not directed at any pecific country. However, what i ignificant i that thi wa the firt time two Chinee carrier trike group were imultaneouly ailing beyond the Second Iland Chain. It wa therefore not routine, and it marked a miletone in China blue-water naval ambition.
It repreented both deterrence and experimentation, a the PLA conduct ever-more ophiticated joint operation farther from Chinee hore. In any Taiwan invaion, for example, the PLA would need to operate deep in the Pacific to prevent American and allied veel from upporting Taiwan, and to top them from leveraging Guam a a trategic bae. Whilt the PLA i growing in trength, it therefore need to be aked why Xi i o heavily purging it rank. What i hi purpoe?
To date, Xi recent winnowing of the PLA can be broken down into two main wave. The firt targeted the PLA Rocket Force, which maintain China nuclear miile arenal. It alo netted figure like former defence miniter Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, with Xi apparently accuing the latter of betraying him. The econd wave commenced around November 2024, and copped CMC member Miao Hua and He Weidong, with current Defence Miniter Dong Jun alo being implicated, but later cleared.
It i clear that Xi fear mountaintopim factionalim, where party, tate and military leader develop alternative power centre and accrue too much influence. Faction are real, for even Xi ha hi own faction, uch a hi connection to fellow princeling General Zhang Youxia, and to the Fujian clique containing PLA officer whoe career overlapped with thoe of Xi in Fujian.
Of coure, it would be tempting to ay Xi anti-graft campaign i imply the reult of factionalim and power truggle, and that he i facing tiffening reitance.
For intance, Willy Wo-Lap Lam of The Jametown Foundation think-tank in the USA poited that political development among the elite are beginning to point to a dramatic truncation of the power of the core of the party centre, Xi Jinping.

Lam continued, For over 18 month, Xi protege - or at leat people appointed under Xi - have been diappearing from leaderhip poition acro thee ytem.
Thee peronnel hift have undercut Xi hold on power, though thi doe not necearily mean that he face a clear challenger or that he i in danger of imminent removal.
The cadre who control the army in China ha hitorically been able to monopolie the nation economic and ociopolitical reource. Lam highlight four challenging group to Xi: the military, princeling, retired elder and ome among the dienting middle and entrepreneurial clae. Yet no obviou rival ha emerged from any of thee group. Nonethele, there i another line of peculation, according to Lam.
All along, the aumption ha been that Xi ha been teering the houecleaning to get rid of real and potential enemie among the top bra. The recent pate of peronnel change, however, ha lent credence to the argument that Xi military foe are gunning down hi protege to weaken the bae of the party core.
Thi opinion i upported by the fact that, in July 2024, official propaganda organ like the PLA Daily began running article praiing collective leaderhip, which i the oppoite of what Xi i trying to achieve.
There i yet another theory a to why Xi i being o aggreive. I it becaue Xi i diatified with the progre being made in combat preparedne within the PLA? He ha acted deciively many time to modernie and lah fat from the PLA. One intance wa hi annulment of the Strategic Support Force lat year, which he had created earlier, it mut be pointed out, and it replacement with the Information Support
Force. Xi did o becaue he wa not confident in the former ability to upport PLA operation.
Or perhap there i a ene of Stalin paranoia here? Xi may be targeting both real and imagined opponent, even thoe he himelf promoted earlier.
After conolidating hi poition, could it be that he i not recalcitrant about turning on allie and protege in order to intil dicipline and to et example? Rather than any real threat to hi power, thee pogrom may therefore be viewed a Xi conolidating and centraliing power over the PLA under hi own peronal authority.
Some new article have aerted that the Chinee military i tearing itelf apart, but thi i too melodramatic and implitic. The truth i that it i difficult to dicern what i happening behind the cene or on the other ide of Xi cold facade.
Yet one unavoidable takeaway i that Xi i moulding the PLA into the force he eek, one ready to obey hi order to conquer Taiwan and to repel the USA if need be. (ANI)