Does Washington have a Selective Human-Rights Lens?

Human rights are often presented as a bright line in US foreign policy. In practice, the line bends. When criticising a country that won’t hurt its interests, the US speaks strongly about human rights. However, when a country is an important partner for security or trade, the US often softens its tone or remains silent. 

This pattern shows up in statements, sanctions and aid decisions. Strong words arrive when they won’t disrupt military cooperation or energy routes. Softer words appear when a partner is needed for counterterrorism, access to bases, or balancing a rival power. Over time, people notice the difference. Activists feel let down. Governments learn to bargain, promising small reforms to keep support flowing. The result is a gap between values and actions.

India and other countries in South Asia read this gap and choose a balanced path. They engage the US but keep their own priorities higher. For Washington to rebuild trust, it would need to have the same standards for friends and critics. Clear timelines for reforms and consequences that apply to all are a must. 

In December 2021, the US sanctioned Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion under the Global Magnitsky Act, citing serious abuses and disappearances. The Treasury’s language was firm and specific and travel bans followed for individual officers. 

Contrast that with the approach to select allies. In 2024, despite years of concerns, the administration waived human-rights conditions and approved the full 1.3 billion USD in military aid to Egypt This justified the decision on national-security grounds. Rights groups called it a retreat, whereas Washington called it a necessity. 

US outlets described the poll as not credible

The split screen was on display again after Bangladesh’s January 7, 2024, election. The State Department noted the Awami League’s victory but stressed concerns and urged investigations into irregularities and violence. Major US outlets described the poll as not credible. The tone was critical, yet calibrated. Firm enough to signal disapproval, careful enough to preserve leverage. 

Exceptions for strategic partners are not new. US law often allows waivers when national security is invoked and those waivers get used. Egypt’s case is the clearest recent example. Pakistan has also received continued US assistance even amid persistent rights concerns on the argument that cooperation serves broader stability and counterterrorism goals. 

moral leadership sound like strategy

South Asia offers more illustrations of selective outrage. Bangladesh has drawn sharp US pressure from RAB sanctions to visa restrictions ahead of the 2024 vote—while other governments with contentious records have faced gentler public handling when their cooperation is needed for regional security or great-power competition. This unevenness may be realpolitik but it makes moral leadership sound like strategy by another name. 

Indi foreign policy as interest-drive

India has read this landscape and kept its balance. New Delhi speaks the language of values but guards strategic autonomy, practicing multi-alignment rather than alliance politics. Senior officials repeatedly frame India’s foreign policy as interest-driven and independent-engaging many powers without being bound by any. That posture helps India navigate competing pressures without importing other countries’ double standards. 

Washington’s talk of rights is most credible when it is consistent. When waivers and work-arounds become the rule with friends, criticism of others starts to look like leverage, not principle. In a region that prizes sovereignty and resilience, countries will keep listening to what America does more than what it says.