Smugglers Without Borders: How Pakistan’s Maritime Narcotics Feed Middle East Demand

Pakistan navy seizes drugs: In October 2025, the US Central Command said two stateless dhows in the Arabian Sea were stopped by the Pakistan Navy working for the Saudi-led CTF-150, yielding more than $972 million worth of crystal meth and cocaine. The Combined Maritime Forces and multiple outlets detailed the two back-to-back seizures, pointing out how large, mixed drug loads still move along dhow routes toward the Gulf. 

For years, Pakistani trafficking networks have treated the Arabian Sea like a highway. They launch from the Makran coast, load or consolidate cargo at sea and run stateless dhows toward Oman and the UAE or further to East Africa, where the loads are broken up and sold on. UNODC calls this the 'Southern Route' for Afghan-linked opiates and, increasingly, methamphetamine. Official descriptions explicitly reference dhow departures from the Makran coast. 

The dhow is the perfect cover. It looks like every other wooden fishing boat. It can claim no nationality, avoid AIS beacons and blend into coastal traffic. That is why interdictions cluster in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, where multi-national patrols focus on stateless vessels. CMF and partner navies have logged repeated finds of heroin, hashish and meth on these boats over the last several years, including multi-hundred-kilogram meth hauls by US Coast Guard cutters and Royal Navy ships. 

Demand in Gulf markets is real and growing. Police bulletins in the UAE and Oman show regular crystal-meth seizures, arrests of Asian nationals linked to smuggling cells, and warnings about more 'sophisticated' concealment methods. In August 2025, Abu Dhabi Police reported a 377-kg crystal-meth seizure hidden in oil cans.  Dubai Police soon after said a villa-based network tied to an overseas controller had been dismantled. Oman’s Royal Oman Police has issued multiple updates on crystal-meth interdictions along its coast this year. These are not maritime cases by themselves, but they are the onshore end of the same supply chain that sails from the Arabian Sea. 

East Africa sits on the other branch of the route. European and UN assessments note dhow runs from the Makran coast to East African shores, where consignments move inland or onward by container. As patrols have improved in some lanes, traffickers have shifted between dhows and containerised cargo. But the basic geometry is that the launch takes place from Pakistan’s coast, pushes across to a permissive landing before dispersing. 

If seizures are the proof, 2024–2025 provided plenty. In early 2024, CMF units reported meth hauls from dhows in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman. In March 2025, Royal Navy frigate HMS Lancaster interdicted heroin and meth in one stop. The October 2025 twin seizures credited to Pakistan Navy ship Yarmook were the clearest sign that meth, not just heroin, is now central to the business model. Meth’s high value-to-volume ratio suits small crews and long sea legs. It pays even when only part of the cargo gets through. 

UNODC’s work on the Southern Route and EU drug-market reporting point to the Pakistani side of the Makran coastline as a recurring origin for dhow departures. That coastline is long, thinly policed and dotted with informal jetties. Skiffs can sprint from beaches, feed a dhow just outside territorial waters and vanish. Even when interdictions do not publicly name the departure beach, the method —stateless dhow, Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman, mixed cargo—keeps repeating in the same neighbourhood.

Gulf authorities have adapted. Coast-guard patrols have increased; customs units talk openly about complex concealment and about overseas controllers directing local runners.

Pakistan’s official stance is that it is a partner against drugs and it does sometimes make large seizures, as October’s case shows. But the same public record paints a harder truth--local criminal ecosystems on the Makran coast profit from this trade and stateless dhow tactics rely on nearby fuel, fixers and launch points. When these networks succeed, the Gulf pays the social cost while the suppliers collect in cash.

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